The
Faith-Based Initiative Re-Ups
by
Dennis R. Hoover
The faith-based initiative is back. Or so it seems to President Bush, who at
a March 1 White House Faith-based and Community Initiatives Leadership
Conference announced ambitious plans for advancing the initiative in his
second term.
What really caught journalists’ attention, however, was some praise for it
from another politician—Sen. Hilary Rodham Clinton. “There is no
contradiction between support for faith-based initiatives and upholding our
constitutional principles,”
Clinton
declared in keynoting an awards ceremony at a faith-based agency in Boston
on the eve of Bush’s second inauguration, according to a report by Michael
Jonas in the Boston Globe. “I’ve always been a praying person,” she
added.
This high-profile (re)emergence of seeming bipartisanship underscores a
confusion that has plagued coverage of the faith-based initiative since the
beginning of the Bush administration: Is the initiative a creature of the
right wing, a sop to socially conservative evangelicals? Or is it a
manifestation of “third way” politics—an item on Bush’s (short) list of
centrist achievements with which a savvy 2008 Democratic presidential
hopeful might want to be associated?
The latter view has surfaced in discussions of the Democrats’ losses last
November. Exit polls showing that a slight plurality of voters considered
“moral values” the key issue in the campaign kicked off a continuing process
of Democratic soul-searching. The worry is that the electorate has concluded
that the Democratic Party has no soul to search.
The answer proposed by some Democrats (and warmly contested by others) is to
tack to the center on hot-button issues involving religion. As Rev. Eugene
Rivers, a prominent African-American Democrat and long-time backer of the
faith-based initiative, explained to the Boston Herald’s Howard Manly
January 4, “Liberals, especially those high-minded liberals, really don’t
understand the faith factor. This move by Sen. Clinton should be
particularly important to Democrats given the significance of the values
issue in the recent election.”
For Hilary Clinton the strategy is a family favorite. It was her husband,
after all, who signed into law the first legislative version of the
faith-based initiative—the “charitable choice” provision introduced into the
1996 welfare reform bill by then-senator John Ashcroft of Missouri.
“Sen. Clinton Goes Right; Like Former President Bill Clinton Before Her,
She’s Paving a ‘Third Way’ Between Liberalism and Conservatism,” ran the
headline on Jerry Zremski’s A1 story in the March 20 Buffalo News.
Zremski took Sen. Clinton’s rhetorical embrace of the faith-based initiative
as one of several signs of a serious effort to shed her image as a
left-liberal icon.
This characterization of the faith-based initiative as something with
crossover appeal was rare early in George W. Bush’s first term. Perhaps
because they had little background on the history and particulars of the
policy, journalists tended to associate it mainly with Bush’s ties to
conservative evangelicals. As a result, not a single news story anticipated
the criticism the initiative received from the religious right.
Some conservative critics (Pat Robertson among them) worried that the policy
was too pluralistic—that it would permit faith groups which they consider
dangerous cults to become providers of publicly subsidized social services.
Others, like University of Texas journalism professor Marvin Olasky (widely
and inaccurately described as the godfather of charitable choice),
complained that the policy would perpetuate government-funded welfare
instead of reverting to good ol’ fashioned, privately funded rescue
missions.
Ever since Bush took office there has been a profound disconnection between
the way the issue has played out in Congress and how it has been received at
the political and religious grassroots.
In Congress, a bill meant to legislatively reaffirm and expand the
initiative turned into a partisan lightning rod. Its hapless history need
not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the bill languished through the
first Bush term even after most of the legislative language providing
explicit protection for faith-based service con-tractors was removed, and
even after the tax incentives for private humanitarianism were reduced to a
pittance.
What’s more, reauthorization of existing laws that contain charitable choice
provisions became a perennial fight, focused primarily on the question of
whether faith-based organizations providing publicly funded services should
be allowed to use religion as a criterion in their hiring.
But while the argument in Congress has seemed to conform to a stock “culture
wars” narrative pitting religious right against religious left, out in the
country the initiative continues to align with what
might, for lack of a better term, be called the
religious center. This center is populated by moderate Catholics and
evangelicals (both white and Hispanic), and by a growing number of black
Protestants.
The latter group is of course overwhelmingly Democratic. But it is
noteworthy that between 2000 and 2004 Bush increased his percentage of the
black vote from just nine percent to 13 percent.
Journalists seemed to find it novel and newsworthy that in the 2004 election
cycle the faith-based initiative opened doors for Bush among black
churchgoers. Newsworthy it was, but hardly novel. According to a widely
cited 1998 national survey of congregations conducted by University of
Arizona sociologist Mark Chaves, nearly two-thirds of black churches
expressed interest in applying for government funds for social services—far
higher than any other religious group.
The Washington Post was on to the story earlier than most. “Bush
Courts Black Voters; In Southern Trip, He Emphasizes Faith-Based Plan” noted
Amy Goldstein’s January 16, 2004 article. Later in the year, in the fall
run-up to the election, other news media picked up on this angle of the
story, particularly in battleground states.
For example, on October 18, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s
Leonard Sykes reported on a significant coup scored by Bush in Wisconsin—an
endorsement by Bishop Sedgwick Daniels, pastor of the 8,000-member Holy
Redeemer Institutional Church of God in Christ, which sponsors many social
services. Formerly a supporter of Democrats, Daniels switched to Bush
because of school vouchers and faith-based initiatives.
While Bush did not increase his nationwide share of the black vote by much,
as Jonathan Tilove astutely reported in the November 7 New Orleans Times
Picayune, even small gains can be significant in a tight election. In
Ohio, a state vital to Bush’s Electoral College majority, Bush won 16
percent of the black vote, up from nine percent in 2000. Using analysis
provided by David Bositis, a scholar of black politics at the Joint Center
for Political and Economic Studies, Tilove noted that the change among black
voters resulted in a net switch of 110,000 votes—which accounts for almost
all of Bush’s slender margin in the state (136,000).
The Los Angeles Times devoted multiple articles and many column
inches to providing exemplary coverage. In a 3,400-word piece published
January 18, Peter Wallsten, Tom Hamburger, and Nicholas Riccardi noted that
the conversions of black pastors were not entirely spontaneous. Just as
Democrats have wooed black pastors for decades, the GOP is now painstakingly
competing for their support, using traditional “moral values” issues like
abortion and gay marriage alongside school vouchers and faith-based social
services.
“The political benefits are un-believable,” Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, a
traditional values activist who helped craft the GOP strategy, told the
Times. “The Democrats ought to have their heads examined for voting
against this.” In March, the syndicated African-American columnist Clarence
Page conceded as much: “As long as black voters, especially churchgoing
black voters, see Mr. Bush as fighting for programs that can help black
communities while his mostly Democratic critics are seen as getting in the
way, Mr. Bush wins.”
Notwithstanding such political traction, the administration’s failure to
translate the faith-based initiative’s “religious center” appeal into
bipartisan-ship in Washington remains noteworthy. Perhaps bipartisanship is
not what certain administration strategists ever really wanted, but in any
case, lack of progress in Congress has forced Bush to achieve his desired
expansion of charitable choice via a series of executive orders. All those
regulations are vulnerable to reversal the minute a new president takes
office.
The best analysis by journalists of the Bush administration’s failure to
govern from the center on this issue is still the April 23, 2003
Washington Post article by Dana Milbank and Alan Cooperman, “Bush
Legislative Approach Failed in Faith Bill Battle; White House Is Faulted for
Not Building a Consensus in Congress.” The approach the Bush administration
pursued was reminiscent of the take-no-prisoners strategy employed in its
tax cut legislation: Present the Democrats with a fully formed policy and
dare them to object. They did dare.
“Bush’s faith-based advisers re-commended proceeding with the
noncontroversial tax incentives while holding off on the ‘charitable choice’
provisions to see if a consensus could be reached or if less controversial
alternatives, such as vouchers or tax credits for individuals receiving
treatment, could achieve the same purpose,” explained Milbank and Cooperman.
“But Karl Rove and Bush’s other political strategists were hearing none of
it. These advisers encouraged House Republicans to proceed quickly with
full-fledged faith legislation, vastly expanding charitable choice.”
Furthermore, Bush failed to use his clout to “coerce reluctant lawmakers to
support the legislation’s significant price tag.”
In fact, there was enough blame to spread around on a bipartisan basis.
The politics of the faith-based initiative can be arrayed on two continuums:
religion and money. At the extremes, the left wanted lots of government
money for (and lots of control of) social services, with religion kept
strictly separate, while the right wanted zero government money
(i.e., private charity only) and lots of religious morality and born-again
con--versions. In the middle, various approaches were possible.
For purposes of (admittedly simplistic) illustration, consider the following
chart:
To most observers, the world of social services prior to the advent of the
faith-based initiative looked like position 4 on this chart. Therefore,
logically, the best way for the Bush administration to attract center-left
Democrats to its cause would have been to adopt position 4 with respect to
money, and to find the least scary version of position 3 when it came to a
“level playing field” for religion. At a minimum, it should have gone the
extra mile to prove it was not interested in moving any further right than
position 3 vis-à-vis money or religion. Instead, it raised fears that its
true intentions were represented by position 2.
Ecumenically minded Democrats who were sympathetic to the faith-based
initiative, such as E. J. Dionne and Jim Wallis,
felt betrayed early on by the administration’s unwillingness to show the
religious center the money. In a June 2003 letter to the president (quoted
by Dionne in his June 10 Washington Post column), Wallis spoke for
many of them: “The lack of consistent, coherent and integrated domestic
policy that benefits low-income people makes our continued support for your
faith-based initiative increasingly untenable.”
Nor has this complaint been confined to the left. In February of this year,
David Kuo, former deputy director of the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives, broke ranks, taking to the web pages of
Beliefnet.com to blast the administration for breaking its promises.
Describing the White House effort as “minimal,” Kuo wrote, “No
administration since [Lyndon B. Johnson’s] has had a more successful
legislative record than this one. From tax cuts to Medicare, the White House
gets what the White House really wants. It never really wanted the ‘poor
people stuff.’” His comments were picked up by the Los Angeles Times
in a February 15 article headlined “Faith-Based Plan Lacks Funds,
Ex-Official Says.”
But if Republicans had trouble thinking outside their normal box when it
came to funding, the same was true for Democrats when it came to the “faith”
part of the faith-based initiative. There is little point in calling it a
“faith-based” initiative if in practice religious providers are
indistinguishable from secular ones. Some Democrats made the disingenuous
claim that the “compromise” position was to provide funding for providers
that are nominally affiliated with a religious group but secular in every
operational sense. This was not a compromise; it was a reiteration of the
status quo of the 1970s.
To be sure, under strict-separationist interpretations of the establishment
clause of the Constitution, direct or indirect funding of programs that have
religious content is unacceptable. But that interpretation is no longer the
law of the land, and, in any case, it certainly no longer represents a
“centrist” position in American political culture.
The biggest sticking point has been the issue of hiring. When faith-based
organizations are awarded service contracts and then hire staff in part on
the basis of religion, most Democrats have charged that it amounts to
government-funded job discrimination, not religious freedom for faith-based
organizations. But for true believers in the faith-based initiative,
protecting religious hiring is only common sense—and absolutely
non-negotiable.
Notwithstanding its embarrassing retreats on its original faith-based bill,
the Bush administration has pressed hard on this issue. In June of 2003, the
administration sent a position paper to Congress spelling out its reasoning.
When Ronald J. Sider, an evangelical Democrat who backs robust faith-based
initiatives, was asked about it by the Washington Post, he remarked
that it “indicates that they’re serious—and they darn well better be,
because it’s crucial to a whole lot of us.”
Bush stressed the point again in his March 1 speech this year. The very next
day, the House passed a Job Training Improvement bill that included explicit
hiring protections for faith-based programs.
News coverage of the speech and the House action was thin—which is
surprising, because the constitutional controversy over religious hiring is
very likely to come to a head soon. The exception among major papers was,
once again, the Los Angeles Times, which ran stories on both March 3
and March 7.
“Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 preserves the right of religious
organizations to discriminate in hiring, it does not address the question of
whether that applies to groups that accept public funds,” explained the
Times’ Richard B. Schmitt on March 7. “That issue has not been legally
resolved.” If the bill passes the Senate (which is not certain), it will
almost certainly end up before the Supreme Court. In the same story, Schmitt
also provided careful coverage of an important ongoing court case against
the Salvation Army in New York that raises similar issues.
Liberal members of Congress and liberal interest groups are increasingly
singling out the hiring issue as a political and legal cause célèbre.
This bodes ill, of course, for the revival of the religious center in
Congress. But what none of the recent coverage has explored is the crucial
distinction between religious hiring in programs funded directly by the
government or indirectly.
The latter alternative has much bright-er constitutional and political prospects than the
former. Indeed, as the Washington Post’s Milbank and Cooperman
suggested back in their 2003 analysis, an opportunity has perhaps been
missed all along to find a more genuine compromise—namely, by pursuing “less
controversial alternatives, such as vouchers.”
In theory, social service contracts that follow charitable choice rules
produce an effect for beneficiaries similar to voucherized programs: Clients
are only exposed to religious programs voluntarily. However, in order to
maintain the delicate church-state balance, contracts with faith-based
organizations are more complicated to monitor and run (funds must be
segregated, opt-out policies must be created, etc.)—and they are more
susceptible to the appearance, if not the reality, of political and
religious corruption.
Voucherized systems are more transparent. They put the “choice” part of
charitable choice more unambiguously in beneficiaries’ hands, and the route
by which government funds arrive in religious organizations’ accounts is
indirect.
To be sure, voucherization by no means eliminates all the potential abuses.
But, at a minimum, the longstanding policy precedents (e.g., grants and
loans to individuals attending sectarian colleges) and the new
constitutional standing of the voucher principle (the Supreme Court’s 2002
Zelman decision) make it a much more secure basis on which to
proceed.
Most likely, this is why one of the major priorities announced on March 1 by
Bush for his faith-based initiative is “to identify programs that could be
changed to expand individual choice [read: voucherize], including in
mentoring, housing counseling and transitional housing, after-school
programs, and homeless services.”
There may be too much partisan water under the bridge for our current
faith-based president to recapture the religious center by funding
initiatives in areas like this. But don’t rule out our next faith-based
president trying again.
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