Contents,
Summer 2001
Quick Links:
Related Articles
"What Really Happened in
Uganda?", Religion in the News, Summer 2000
"Religious Ironies in East
Timor", Religion in the News, Spring 2000
"Wars of
Religion", Religion in the News, Spring 2000
"Why Smash the Falun
Gong?", Religion in the News, Fall 1999
Quick Links:
Other articles
in this issue
From the Editor: The
Minister, the Rabbi, and the Baccalaureate
Purging Ourselves of Timothy
McVeigh
The Pope Among the
Orthodox
Faith-Based Update: Bipartisan
Breakdown
The Perils of Polling
The Rael Deal.
Superceding the Jews
Jamming the Jews
Evangelism in a Chilly Climate
Correspondence:
Palestinians and Israelis
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Idol Threats
by Thomas Barfield
The March 2001 destruction in central Afghanistan of the world’s
tallest standing Buddhas by the Taliban regime brought international
attention to both the country’s rich historic past and its radical Islamic
present. For good measure the Taliban also ordered the destruction of all
statues in the Kabul Museum and at all archaeological sites. These wanton
acts of cultural mutilation produced a universal cry of outrage to which the
Taliban appeared impervious.
As the destruction began, The Christian Science Monitor declared
it "a giant step backward for civilization" while the Bangkok
Post argued that "such an act puts the regime beyond redemption in
the eyes of the world community." After the destruction was complete,
the New York Times called it a "shocking act, even by the
standards of the Taliban, whose suffocating form of Islam has already
outraged the world."
While this outcry was not the first against the Taliban, it reflected a
level of complete frustration because the act appeared so senseless and had
occurred so suddenly. Even before issuing its edict demanding the
destruction of the Buddhas, the regime had been involved in a running series
of disputes with the international community concerning women’s rights to
work and education, drug trafficking, the harboring of terrorists, and the
harassment of local Afghan and foreign workers involved in delivering
international food aid and medical services.
The Taliban’s international image had also been previously damaged by
its summary executions and amputations in public stadiums—one of the few
forms of entertainment permitted in a country in which all images (pictures,
films, television, video) had been banned along with all music except for
religious singing. It was as if the Taliban had designed a remarkably
complete symbolic checklist of offensive policies designed to alienate as
wide a variety of nations and cultural traditions as possible.
The Taliban’s response to these complaints generally took two forms:
first, that their reclusive leader, Mullah Omar, was carrying out God’s
will and imposing a true Islamic system in Afghanistan that superseded any
kind of secular law or treaty; and second, that outsiders did not understand
Afghan culture and had no right to comment on the country’s internal
affairs, particularly regarding the status of women. Had the regime sought
strict isolation (as a Central Asian North Korea), it might have been able
to ignore these complaints. But there has always been a paradoxical element
of intense engagement by the Taliban with an outside world whose values it
condemns.
The regime desperately craves diplomatic recognition as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan—recognition currently accorded only by Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, to stave off famine
after years of severe drought it is highly dependent on foreign aid from
countries and international institutions that it regularly insults. The
United Nations and NGOs deliver most of this aid within Afghanistan, but
their efforts are financed largely by the United States, the European
Community, and Japan. Thus representatives of the Taliban have often
appeared willing to bargain with the international community on women’s
rights, drug production, and harboring terrorists.
One issue that had not been troubling its relations with the rest of the
world was the status of the Bamiyan Buddhas. Even before they captured
Bamiyan in 1998, the Taliban had sought to reassure the world that they were
no barbarians. In April 1997, for example, the Taliban’s ambassador to
Pakistan, Mohammad Masoom Afghani, was quoted by Agence France Press as
saying, "The Supreme Council has refused the destruction of the
sculptures because there is no worship of these."
After Bamiyan was taken, some Taliban hard-liners did threaten to destroy
the monuments as "unIslamic," but they were overruled with an eye
to developing tourism and guards were posted to prevent individuals from
damaging them. In September 2000, Mullah Omar himself confirmed this
position in a decree reported by the London Observer’s Luke
Harding: "The government considers the Bamiyan statues as an example of
a potential major source of income for Afghanistan from international
visitors. The Taliban states that Bamiyan shall not be destroyed but be
protected."
So it came as a shock when late last February Mullah Omar reversed
himself with an edict that commanded the immediate destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas. As reported by Agence France Presse from Kabul, the decree
declared, "Based on the verdict of the clergymen and the decision of
the Supreme Court of the Islamic Emirate [Taliban] all the statues around
Afghanistan must be destroyed. All the statues in the country should be
destroyed because these statues have been used as idols and deities by the
non-believers before. They are respected now and may be turned into idols in
future too. Only Allah, the Almighty, deserves to be worshipped, not anyone
or anything else."
This edict seemed to catch even many high Taliban officials by surprise.
According to the London Guardian, Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil
Ahmed Mutawakel had calmly assured a foreign delegation of the regime’s
cooperation in preserving what was left of Afghanistan’s cultural legacy
only hours before the decree was broadcast.
The destruction began immediately and was fully accomplished within two
weeks. This occurred despite a flurry of official calls to stop from an
astoundingly wide array of sources from all over the world. Buddhist
countries were particularly incensed and looked upon the action as an
assault on their own religious tradition. Japan, one of the largest donors
of aid to Afghanistan, took the lead in demanding the regime halt its
actions but Sri Lanka and Thailand became directly involved too. Muslim
nations also attacked the Taliban. On March 4, The New York Times
reported that UNESCO’s 22 member Arab Group, including Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates, had condemned the destruction as
"savage."
A large delegation of Islamic scholars from Cairo went to Kandahar to
argue that there was no justification in Islamic law for destroying such
cultural monuments. They were ignored even though their religious
qualifications were far superior to those of the Taliban clerics. In a March
6 interview on Tehran television (reported on BBC Worldwide), former Iranian
Prime Minster Rafsanjani declared, "There is no logic behind this [Taliban’s
action]. The logic of opposition to statues and the idolatry aspect of the
issue do not apply to this particular case."
The United States and the European Community condemned the actions as an
attack on the world’s cultural patrimony. Western museums and the Indian
government offered to buy and remove anything the Taliban considered
offensive. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had many fruitless meeting with
Taliban officials. Even Pakistan, the Taliban’s closest ally, attempted to
get them to reconsider but failed.
The international press coverage of these events faced two challenges:
first, remedying the world’s lack of awareness that the monuments existed;
and second, explaining why the Taliban would be willing to pay such a great
political price to destroy them.
The Bamiyan statues may have been the world’s tallest Buddhas
(175 and 120 feet respectively), but they were not well known to the public
at large. Located in a remote valley in the Hindu Kush that was once one of
the key nodes of the ancient silk route, they were part of a monastic
complex carved out of the valley’s cliff face that once supported 5,000
monks. Hsüan-tsang, a Buddhist monk from China who passed through the
region in 632, described how the stone Buddhas employed a wooden
superstructure designed to raise and lower the arms to greet visiting
pilgrims.
Within a few centuries, however, Islam had completely replaced Buddhism
in the region and the complex was abandoned as a religious center. Because
the colossal statues were carved from living rock they survived the
centuries, although details like the painted mud face and wooden arms were
lost. The statues had never been previously subject to religious dispute.
The growing international recognition of the significance of cultural
monuments around the world (typified by the United Nations’ "World
Heritage List") made the deliberate destruction of such a site a
high-profile story that was easy to understand. American television reports
on CBS, ABC, NBC, and CNN all focused entirely on the tragedy of the
destruction itself and the Taliban’s refusal to consider any compromise.
With the exception of press coverage in India, where anti-Muslim rioting had
broken out, almost all news accounts also stressed that the Taliban’s
actions had been condemned by Islamic clerics outside of Afghanistan and
that Muslims were as offended as everyone else.
But explaining why the Taliban decided to destroy the Buddhas was not so
easy. Here was a symbolic act that that appeared to bring the regime
universal opprobrium without any corresponding benefit. Most newspaper and
magazine stories attempted to find some hidden logic or strategy by which
the Taliban would derive benefit. Of necessity, these explanations were
based on little more than guesswork. In fact, the Taliban spokesmen overseas
seemed to be scrambling as much as the journalists. During interviews they
often appeared to be making up explanations as they went along, seeking to
find a more compelling explanation than "Mullah Omar changed his
mind."
In the early stages, many Taliban officials even suggested that the
decree might not be final. For example, Laili Helms, a self-identified
adviser to the Taliban in the United States, argued on National Public Radio’s
"Talk of the Nation" March 6 that the Buddhas would not be
destroyed. "I think there are internal politics inside Afghanistan that
you’d be surprised to hear that most of the leadership and the ministers
of the Taliban are hoping that this doesn’t take place, you know,"
Helms said. "The news hasn’t come through clearly enough in terms of
where this fatwa originally came from. It came from the religious
clerics, it came from the Ulama, not from the head of any ministry or the
head of government. They’ve been giving, issuing announcements, kind of
confirming the clerics. But to this day, since about a week ago, over a week
ago, nothing has been touched."
While Helms may have been right about the politics, she was of course
wrong about the power of the clerics to see their will done. And once it
was, whatever public disagreement or disbelief there was within the Taliban
movement itself disappeared.
The roving Taliban envoy visiting the United States at the time, Sayed
Rahmatullah Hashimi, explained the destruction on the grounds that
foreigners had offered money to preserve monuments but not feed people. In a
March 21 interview on National Public Radio he said that Afghan officials
had told him that if the world "does not care or if the world is
destroying the future of our children with economic sanctions, how do they
care about our past?"
Since, according to Afghan officials, the decree had been months in
preparation, his explanation of its origin appeared opportunistic. But many
other analysts also sought to tie the destruction to external political
relations and took the view that the Taliban were lashing out against
their diplomatic isolation and the particularly tough new sanctions imposed
by the U.N. at the beginning of 2001. "Sanctions may be the short
answer" for why the Taliban acted as they did, Newsweek declared
April 2, claiming that the world’s pressure on the Taliban to give up
Islamic militant Osama bin Laden and end their support of regional Islamic
separatists had backfired.
Still others looked to local politics. "Some analysts in Kabul and
in Pakistan suggested that the Buddhas’ destruction was also aimed at
punishing the inhabitants of Bamiyan, most of whom are Shiite Muslims from
the Hazara ethnic group and many of whom support armed opposition groups
fighting Taleban rule," the Washington Post’s Pamela Constable
reported March 19. "The Taliban, a movement of militant Sunni Muslims,
regards Shiites as infidels." Constable also suggested that
hard-liners had put through the policy deliberately to isolate Afghanistan
further in the hopes of creating an Islamic state without compromises.
Yet as events proceeded, it became clear that destroying the Buddhas and
other art treasures could not have been a calculated strategy to get
something from the rest of the world. If the Taliban had really been seeking
more aid for Afghanistan’s starving children, they would have relented
upon being offered money, which they absolutely refused to consider.
Nor did the new policy improve the regime’s chances for international
recognition. Indeed, the controversy completely obscured the Taliban’s
important policy change in implementing a ban on opium production. During
the previous year Afghanistan had obtained the dubious distinction of
becoming the world’s largest opium producer, but just as clear evidence
was emerging that the new policy was actually being enforced throughout
Taliban-controlled territory, the Buddha controversy arose and the Taliban
got little or no credit.
On the other hand, if the Taliban had really been interested in lashing
out at the world, doubling the production of opium rather than breaking
statutes would have had a greater impact.
As for the internal politics, they were harder to read because the
Taliban are so opaque. It is unlikely, however, that the Bamiyan Buddhas
were destroyed in order to get back at the Hazaras, because the monuments
held no ritual significance for them. The Pashtun Taliban and the Hazaras do
have a long history of animosity, dating back to the brutal Afghan conquest
of the region in the 1890s. But the Taliban have rarely resorted to symbolic
actions when more direct ones were available. They murdered the main Hazara
political leader, Ali Mazari, in 1995 after first allying with him. They
have also been accused of the massacre of 3,000 Hazara civilians when they
took the northern city of Mazar-sharif in 1998.
Just a few weeks before the destruction of the Buddhas, a United Nations
rapporteur claimed the Taliban massacred 300 ethnic Hazaras in central
Afghanistan. Even more ominously, a May 14 report on French television
station TF-1 described the widespread circulation of a Pashto language
booklet calling for the wholesale removal of the ethnic Hazara and Tajik
populations and their replacement by Pashtuns.
It may well be that Taliban hard-liners did hope that further isolating
Afghanistan was in their interest. But as much as these hard-liners—and
especially the non-Afghan elements of the Taliban—might want to isolate
the country, at least part of Afghan leadership understood that if all
international aid were withdrawn the regime would likely collapse. In any
event, given the regime’s lack of familiarity with the outside world, it
is most likely that they did not anticipate the firestorm of controversy
their action set off.
In a March 18 press conference in Kabul, Foreign Minister
Mutawakel complained about the lack of attention the opium ban had received
and lamented, "But when some statues of stone were destroyed, the
international community made such a hue and cry, which really astonished
us." He also tried to distance the Taliban’s internal actions from
their demand for recognition, explaining in a March 13 interview in Japan’s
Mainichi Shimbun that the destruction was not an act of retaliation
against the international community for economic sanctions. "We are
destroying the Buddha statues in accordance with Islamic law and it is
purely a religious issue."
It is the Taliban’s insistence that this was a "purely religious
issue" that has been neglected in most news reports. But in fact, the
impetus for the destruction of the Buddhas appears to have been grounded
primarily in the Taliban’s radical iconoclasm and obscurantist
interpretation of Islamic law. The decree was issued by an assembly of
clerics and confirmed by Mullah Omar as a religious issue and does not
appear to have been run past any government officials before it was
announced. It was only the religious justification that was addressed in
domestic Afghan news accounts.
A Taliban editorial in the Kabul newspaper Shari'at published just
after the edict was issued contended that the "objects of worship,
which had been considered as sacred and worshipped in their time in the
past, are filthier than everything else and thus it is necessary that our
beloved country should be cleansed of the existence of such false
objects." That other Islamic scholars rejected this line of
interpretation had no impact on Mullah Omar. "Muslims should be proud
of smashing idols," he boasted in the London Times March 6.
"It has given praise to God that we have destroyed them."
The Egyptian clerics who had visited him in Kandahar to argue this point
were scathing in their opinion of Taliban legal reasoning. In a March 23
interview in the London-based Arabic language newspaper, Al-Sharq al-Awsat,
they condemned the decree as fundamentally flawed "because of [the
Taliban’s] circumstances and their incomplete knowledge of jurisprudence
they were not able to formulate rulings backed by theological evidence. The
issue is a cultural issue. We detected that their knowledge of religion and
jurisprudence is lacking because they have no knowledge of the Arabic
language, linguistics, and literature and hence they did not learn the true
Islam."
But who were they to tell Mullah Omar, the man who named himself Amir-ul
Momineen, or Commander of the Faithful, that he did not know his
business? His only overt response to all the criticism was to order the
sacrifice of 100 cattle March 16 and to give the meat to the poor to express
his regret for taking too long to get the job done and not having done it
earlier.
What has been clear from the beginning of their rule is that the Taliban
have mixed a narrow view of Islam, Pashtun tribal laws, and a melange of
rural folkways to create a worldview that appears natural, logical, and
God-ordained, if only to themselves. They are confounded that anyone would
have the audacity not to agree with them. Perhaps they have not yet reached
the level of the Red Guards who attempted to wipe out China’s past to
create a socialist utopia or Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge who killed a third of
Cambodia’s own people, but they are creating the conditions for a disaster
of similar proportions.
Around Christmas 2000, just before attacking the Buddhas, they issued a
decree declaring that "any Afghan who converts to the rescinded
religion of Christianity will be sentenced to death." On January 13 the
Afghan newspaper Hewad warned, "Anyone caught selling literature
promoting Christianity or Judaism or degrading Islam, its personalities
would be subjected to five years’ imprisonment." In May, after they
destroyed the Buddhist monuments, the Taliban demanded that all Hindus wear
a badge to distinguish themselves from non-Muslims.
On May 26, the Economist editorialized, "Soon there will be
no more religions for the Taliban to insult." It was wrong. The very
next week the Taliban announced that all non-Muslim international aid
workers and journalists must agree to abide by their version of Islamic law
(including punishments such as stoning for adultery) and accept the
authority of the Taliban religious police. If the destruction of the Buddha
"idols" was purely symbolic, this latter demand threatened to
result in the withdrawal of most international aid workers from Afghanistan
at a time when the country’s need was most dire. According to the June 9
London Independent, the UN World Food Program and the Food and
Agriculture Organization have warned that as many as five million Afghans
are in danger of starvation.
Coverage of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas reflected the tendency
of journalists to see religious justifications as a smokescreen for more
"real" explanations based on politics or economics. Yet even
before the Taliban took power, Afghanistan was a land in which religion so
permeated every aspect of life that it would have been unwise to dismiss it
as simply atmospherics. Under the Taliban, the assumption must be that real
religious fire is generating the smoke.
Determined to peer behind the Taliban’s own explanation of their
behavior, few journalists attempted to explain the religious doctrines at
issue (such as iconoclasm) and what these imply for the future of Afghan
society. If Muslim clerics elsewhere said the statues did not have to be
destroyed because they were "no longer being worshiped," did this
imply that it would be right to destroy them if they were? Is the Taliban a
movement outside the accepted bounds of Islam or an extreme interpretation
within it? How should the international community’s cultural relativism
deal with God’s single truth? Inquiring minds still want know.
Related Articles:
"What Really Happened in
Uganda?", Religion in the News, Summer 2000
"Religious Ironies in East
Timor", Religion in the News, Spring 2000
"Wars of
Religion", Religion in the News, Spring 2000
"Why Smash the Falun
Gong?", Religion in the News, Fall 1999
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